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STRATEGIES FOR REDISTRIBUTING RESOURCES TO WOMEN
MARY DALY AND KIRSTEN SCHEIWE
People's financial position and general well-being are in­
timately bound up with the extent to which they can apply their 
skills and time to income-yielding activities. Women's capacity 
to engage in such activity differs substantially from that of 
men. The sexual division of labour which assigns different tasks 
and responsibilities to women and men, placing women in the 
private domain and men in the public sphere, severely constrains 
the use of women's time for income generating activities. This 
paper considers some of the ways in which women's and men's time 
is differentially constructed, and its consequences for their 
income levels. The specific intent is to explore how certain 
institutional provisions determine the resource position of 
women so as to identify alternatives to improve women's finan­
cial situation. The three main income transfer systems are 
considered: the labour market, social security and the 
household/family. Of particular interest are their interactive 
effects. Typically they are treated discretely. Yet they do 
interact and it is their inter-relationships as they affect 
actual resource levels and well-being which we wish to explore.
The discussion will be grounded by examples of the position of 
women vis-a-vis men in two economies: the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) and the United Kingdom (UK). The first part of the 
paper considers the main institutional structures as they affect 




























































































In the second, possible strategies for effecting a more equi­
table distribution of income and time are discussed. Three in 
particular will be considered: individualisation of rights, a 
minimum or basic income, the redistribution of child care costs.
A number of points about the focus of the paper should be noted 
at the outset. First, its consideration of women's financial 
position is confined to income transfers only, thereby omitting 
other forms of inequality and other mechanisms of resource 
transfer such as benefits in kind, education and training, and 
so on. They are outside the paper's scope although acknowledged 
as important determinants of women's social and economic well­
being. Second, the intention of the paper is to discuss and 
raise issues about alternative ways of distributing income and 
time to women. Clearly, to significantly change women's finan­
cial situation is no easy task: witness the limited effects of 
employment equality programmes during the last two decades. 
Apart from the complexity, it requires an information base that 
is much more complete than that currently available. Because 
women's position remained uninvestigated for so long, building 
up a knowledge base about their situation and filling in the 
gaps is a painstaking task. Given these limitations our intent 
is exploratory - to set out a range of policy options, the 
implementation of which needs to be carefully considered.
1. THE STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF WOMEN'S INCOME POSITION
Three main systems of income allocation exist: the labour 
market, the state and the household/family. In the labour market 
wages are the main means of income transfer but pension and 
other social security entitlements also are built up through 
paid employment. In modern society, this is the primary means of 




























































































expected to earn an income (within certain age limits set by the 
prohibition of child labour and retirement rules). State trans­
fer payments, substituting for wages, are subsidiary and usually 
are granted only on the condition that an entitlement has been 
established and that the person is willing to work but unfit or 
unable to find a job. Other state transfers, typically for lower 
amounts, depend on the alternative requirement of a means test,
i.e., that the aggregated household/family income is below a 
certain threshold. The third system of income transfer - the 
household or family - is different in nature and form to the 
other systems. It is informal, relying on the pooling of 
resources (money and time, paid and unpaid work) between mem­
bers. In a way it is an alternative social security system but 
is, in practice, especially for women, primary to state trans­
fers. It is not the individual that is the point of reference 
here but the family unit, the married couple, the cohabiting 
persons or the household. The individuals are bound together 
through legal ties of rights and duties of maintenance, mar­
riage, filiation and other family law institutions.















































































































The distribution of these income resources differs between women 
and men. While men will on average be over-represented in groups 
(1) and (3) deriving their main income from employment and the 
insurance sector, women are over-represented in groups (2) and 
(4) relying mainly on maintenance and welfare as income 
resources. Furthermore, the income derived from (1) and (3) is 
generally higher and gives more economic and legal advantages 
than that derived from (2) and (4).
How is this distribution of income affected by gender? While men 
are expected to work continuously in the labour market, women 
(especially when they have children) must partially or fully 
drop out of or interrupt employment for certain periods to take 
over the main burden of childcare and domestic work. Formerly 
this was explicitly formulated in gendered legal norms (e.g. the 
rules on division of labour of married couples or the different 
duties of mothers/fathers according to family law). These have 
since been changed towards gender-neutral rules. Today, the 
ongoing existence of gendered rights and obligations is excep­
tional. Nevertheless, labour markets and household organization 
continue to operate on a gendered and segmented basis, rein­
forced through existing institutions and economic incentives.
The traditional division of labour within households between 
paid and unpaid work, employment and housework (and intermediary 
forms like full-time or part-time employment of women plus 
housework, etc.) cooperates with an organization of labour 
markets which makes an equal division of work impossible because 
it impedes a sharing or combining of different work types and 




























































































Within the three transfer systems, it is possible to identify 
key institutional mechanisms which perpetuate inequalities 
between women and men.
1.1. How the Labour Market Contributes to Gendered Inequality
Within the labour market, there are two key organisational 
factors which perpetuate income inequities based on gender: time 
organisation and wage inequalities.
1.1.1 Organisation of Time
The labour market is organised on the basis of a standard model 
of full-time employment in which the typical worker invests at 
least 40 hours a week of his time for 40 years. The normal 
working day involves a full eight hours and assumes that 
workers' needs, apart from certain essential functions, will be 
satisfied elsewhere. Only this employment pattern can realise 
the maximum of economic rewards and legal protection. Such 
rewards can be 'topped up' through higher pay for forms of 
'upward' time flexibility - overtime, shift work - while 
'downward' time flexibility, such as part-time work, temporary 
work, is generally less financially advantageous. Given this 
standard model, interruptions in employment cause high losses 
through devaluation of human capital, reduced career oppor­
tunities and loss of seniority rights. This stereotypically male 
model of working time has a number of implications for women.
Given that women bear the primary responsibility for the caring 
role, it is their labour market involvement, rather than that of 
their husbands/partners, which is adjusted to meet domestic 
obligations. Hence, women's employment rate is considerably 
lower and quite different to that of men. For instance, 48% of 




























































































(i.e. in gainful employment) compared with 73% and 70% of men 
respectively.
Women's marital status makes a big difference to their labour 
force activity.
TABLE 1 PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE BY MARITAL 
STATUS IN THE FRG AND UK 1986.
Single Married Widowed/Divorced Total
FRG 55 42 21.5 41
UK 57 53 20 48
Source : Supplement No 30 to Women in Europe, 1988.
In both countries women more likely to have family respon-
sibilities, whether married, widowed or divorced, are less
likely to be in the labour force than those who are single. 
However, there are cultural variations in how marital status 
affects labour force participation. Married women in Britain are 
more likely to be in the labour force than their German counter­
parts. Hence, greater numbers of German women are likely to be 
financially dependent on their husbands.
There is also a life course dimension to female labour force 
participation. In the FRG female employment rates decline rather 
gradually from a peak in the early twenties. British women, in 




























































































labelled "two-humped".1 The first peak occurs during the early 
labour market years, as in Germany. Participation in employment 
then falls between the mid-twenties and the mid-thirties and 
rises significantly until exit from the labour force, typically 
between the ages of 55 and 60 years. What determines these 
patterns?
Responsibility for child-rearing has been identified as the most. 2 important correlate of female labour force participation. It
is the age of the youngest child that is most important, rather 
than the number of children per se. Mothers are highly unlikely 
to be in employment while their children are infants. 
Subsequently, the chances of a British mother having a job rise 
by 9 percentage points a year until the child's fifth birthday. 
From then on, mothers' chances of being in a job continue to 
rise but not as steeply. The presence of a husband/partner is a 
second significant determinant of female labour force participa­
tion. This affects not so much whether a woman is employed or 
not but the nature of her labour market participation: married
women are more likely to work part-time.
Participation in employment on a part-time basis can be directly 
linked to women's 'caring' responsibilities. Part-time work is, 
for a start, almost exclusively female. It is also widespread, 
especially in Britain. In 1986 nearly half (45%) of all women in 
the labour market in the UK worked on a part-time basis compared
1. A. Dale and J. Glover, An Analysis of Women's Employment 
Patterns in the UK, France and the USA: The vlaue of survey 
based comparisons. London: Department of Employment, Research 
Paper No 75, 1990, p5.
2. H. Joshi, 'The cost of caring' in C. Glendinning and J. 
Millar, (eds). Women and Poverty in Britain. Brighton: 




























































































with 5% of employed men. While the contrast is less stark in 
Germany the general pattern is similar: 30% of employed women 
compared with 2% of employed men work on a part-time basis. In 
both countries, married women predominate among female part-time 
workers. The fact that British lone mothers are less likely than 
married mothers to work part-time is probably due not just to 
constraints imposed by their childcare responsibilities but also 
to the fact that wages in many part-time jobs are too low to 
support a family singly.
The full- or part-time nature of labour market participation has 
a significant effect on the outcome of employment. Part-time 
work is lower paid for a start. The full- or part-time nature of 
one's work is also important in another respect in the two 
countries: social security entitlements are tied into the number 
of hours worked as is the coverage of basic employment protec­
tion legislation. In the OK, for instance, a 16 hour weekly 
threshold (reduced to 8 hours if the worker has been in the job 
for five consecutive years) applies for entitlement to redun­
dancy payments, unfair dismissals, maternity pay and the right 
to return to work after maternity leave. This creates two 
classes of workers, the majority of whom (in 1984 three-fifths 
in the UK) are outside the pale of employment protection legis­
lation. Part-time work is also associated with low grade and low 
levels of responsibility, thereby rarely providing an avenue for 
career advancement.
In short, a woman's caring responsibilities determine her 
relationship to the labour market, placing her by and large in a 
secondary or inferior position in terms of the time she has 





























































































Wage differentials are a second contributory factor in gener­
ating gender inequalities. They are widespread. In 1987, German 
women earned 74% of the average hourly male manual wage in 
industry; in Britain the equivalent proportion was 69%. Although 
sex-based wage inequality is currently worse in Britain, in fact 
more progress was made towards equality there during the '70s 
than in Germany. Subsequently, progress slowed and, by 1987, the 
degree of sex-based inequality in earnings was higher in both 
countries than the EC average of 75%.
More detailed evidence on wage differentials is available for 
Britain for 1986 and 1987. It shows that, although men's higher 
earnings are partly explained by longer hours of paid work, 
there is still a substantial gap in the hourly rate at which 
jobs done by women and men are paid. In 1986, as a proportion of
full-time men's gross hourly earnings, that of women was 74% if
3in full-time work and only 58% for those in part-time work. In 
the FRG part-time women workers earned about 10% less per hour
4than their full-time female colleagues in 1984.
Other research corroborates the relative financial disadvantage 
associated with women's work in Britain. An analysis of a sample 
of 32 year olds in 1978 established that some of the pay dif­
ferential between full-time men and women is residual in that it 
is unexplained by differences in ability, education, training
3. H. Joshi, 'Obstacles and opportunities for lone parents as 
breadwinners in Great Britain', in Lone Parent Families: The 
Economic Challenge. Paris: OECD, 1990: 131 - 137.
4. C. Buechtemann and J. Schupp, Zur Soziooekonomie der 
Teilzeitbeschaeftiqunq in der BRD. Berlin: WZB, Discussion 




























































































and employment experience.'’ The quantitative value placed on 
this residual differential was 19%. This residual has been 
attributed both to gender itself and to the pay penalties of 
motherhood (manifested through a combination of lost employment 
experience, a higher incidence of part-time jobs and occupa­
tional downgrading). So being a mother costs women: a typical
British mother is estimated to lose 6 to 7 years of labour force
participation and about twice as many years of average earn- 
6ings.
1.2. How Social Security Contributes to Gender Inequities
Within social security, there are a number of structural factors 
which disadvantage women. A basic organising principle of social 
security is that it is two tiered: the upper tier containing the 
better benefits in terms of the payment received and right of 
entitlement; the lower tier, variously termed 'welfare' or 
'assistance1, providing basic payments for those deemed by a 
means test to be 'deserving'.
Women's relationship to the welfare state is a complex one 
having both positive and negative outcomes. On the positive 
side, the welfare state is a major employer of women (although 
typically at low grades) and the institution of certain payments 
(for example, for lone mothers) has increased women's autonomy 
and reduced hardship.
5. H. Joshi, 'Obstacles and opportunities for lone parents as 
breadwinners in Great Britain', op cit: 135.
6, H. Joshi, 'Gender inequality in the labour market and the 
domestic division of labour' in P. Nolan and S. Paine, (eds), 




























































































On the negative side, the structural mechanisms which create a
• 7disadvantaged position for women include:
- the close connection of the upper tier of better benefits 
to paid work;
- the widespread non-recognition of housework, especially 
child care as a basis for entitlement;
- the prolongation of the labour market's pay discrimination 
via the link between the former wage level and entitlement 
to and level of benefits;
- the privileged role of the patriarchal model of marriage 
and the family (the breadwinner/homemaker model) which is 
subsidised in various ways at the expense of other forms 
of marriage or cohabitation.
The effect of each of these on women's financial security and 
well-being is identifiable in practice.
1.2.1 Connection of Benefits to Labour Market Involvement 
The connection of benefits to the labour market is primarily 
manifested through the contribution principle whereby the amount 
of benefits received and their duration depend on the number of 
contributions paid, seniority and continuity of paid contribu­
tions. Hence, a potential beneficiary may need a minimum period 
of employment, a minimum of weekly working hours or uninter­
rupted employment. In essence, entitlement to social security as 
a right is designed around the traditional model of male working 
life. Among the assumptions that underpin this model are that 
unemployment and interruptions in employment are exceptional in
7. U. Gerhard, A. Schwarzer, V. Slupik, (eds) Auf Kosten der 





























































































a man's working career and are typically short-term, that the 
ill and children will be cared for by a woman unpaid in the 
home, that a married woman can be maintained through the hus­
band's payment.
While this model is problematic for some men, it is more so for 
women since only a minority of women's lives approximate the 
traditional male working pattern. For a start, women's working 
careers are either shorter than those of men or, as has been 
seen above, more frequently interrupted. And the content of 
women's work is also different, being based either fully or 
partly in the home and, if waged, often being low paid and/or 
part-time. In short, tying benefits to labour market involvement 
creates two classes of social security recipients, with women 
forming the majority of the inferior class.
This has a number of practical outcomes:
- fewer women than men have a full entitlement to social 
security. Hence, not only do greater numbers of women 
nor receive a social security payment but the payments 
received by women are generally lower than those of 
men.In the FRG, for example, although women are affected 
by unemployment more than men, fewer women actually 
receive unemployment benefits. This is due to the ef­
fects of reforms in the eligibility criteria which meant 
that one had to have a longer work record to qualify. 
Hence, while women comprised 53.2% of all recipients of 
'unemployment benefits' in 1980 their share had 
decreased to 45.8% in 1988. Women are also disadvantaged 
with regard to pensions as will be shown below.
- greater numbers of women are consigned to the lower tier 
of means-tested payments, the bureaucratic procedure for 




























































































For example, of the adults living on Supplementary 
Benefit in Britain in 1984, 2.3m were single women, lm 
were married women, 1.2m were single men and lm were 
married men. In the FRG in 1988, 55% of the 'welfare' or 
'assistance' claimants were women.
1.2.2 The Non-recognition of Work in the Home
For social security purposes only paid work is recognised as 
legitimate work. Hence, unpaid work, with the exception of 
education or training, does not generally qualify one for social 
security entitlement. There are but a few limited exceptions to 
this principle. In the FRG either women or men (born after 
December 31 1920) who stayed at home to rear children are 
granted one year of pension per child, calculated on the basis 
of 75% of average earnings. (However, the average value of this 
per child is very low at 20,0001r or 13ECU per month.) In 
Britain, also, a limited allowance for caring responsibilities 
was introduced for pension purposes in 1978 but women still 
require 20 years' worth of contributions or credits.
In general, the years spent by a woman on home-related work are 
uncounted for social security purposes, thereby significantly 
disadvantaging them in later years.
1.2.3 The Prolongation of the Labour Market's Pay Discrimination 
One of the clearest examples of how the social security system 
prolongs labour market disadvantage lies in pension regulations. 
They are widely tied to life-time earnings. In Germany, for 
example, one of the key principles underpinning the pension 
system is that of ’individual justice', that is, that each 
individual will maintain a position in retirement that cor­




























































































Qhierarchy. Therefore, German workers' earnings largely deter­
mine their level of living in later years. Since women's
earnings are anywhere up to a third less than those of men,
gender inequalities are perpetuated into the retirement years. 
Research in Germany has identified the following factors as 
determining gender differences in pensions: (formal) schooling,
occupational prestige, labour force participation and firm 9size. Such a pension system, and the British one is quite 
similar in terms of basic principles, has three consequences for 
women.
- fewer women than men are actually covered by a pension
scheme. In Germany for example, 41% of women, compared
with 2.5% of men, in a cohort sample born between 1919 
and 1921 had no pension entitlement. This is despite the 
fact that most of these had been gainfully employed for 
many years of their lives. In Britain, the proportion 
of women belonging to occupational pension schemes is 
about half that of men.- The differences in the private 
sector in the UK are especially marked with 24% of women 
covered by pension provisions compared with 52% of men.
8. J. Allmendinger et al, The Production of Gender Disparities 
Over the Life Course and their Effects in Old Age. Frankfurt: J. 
W. Goethe Institute, Sonderforschungsbereich, Research Paper No 
302, 1989.
9. Ibid: 20.
10. This data comes from the German Life History Study which is 
a nationally representative cohort study of men and women born 
between 1919 and 1961 who were interviewed during the 1980s. In 
all nearly 1,500 women and men were interviewed in 1986 and 
1988. The data used here refers to the cohort born between 1919 
and 1921 as reported in Allmendinger above.
11. A. Walker, 'The poor relations: Poverty among older women' 
in C. Glendinning and J. Millar, (eds), Women and Poverty in 




























































































- when they receive a pension, women get amounts that are 
significantly below those received by men. Among the 
German cohort born between 1919 and 1921, no men but 34% 
of the women receive monthly pension payments below 
300DM. On the other hand, 8% of all men but not a single 
woman receive monthly payments in excess of 3,OOODM. 
In Britain there is also a payments' disparity between 
women and men. This, among other things, has given rise 
to the greater incidence of poverty among older women. 
In 1981, nearly 2 out of every 5 (38%) elderly British 
women were living on incomes below the poverty line
(defined according to Supplementary Benefit rates),
12compared with 28% of men.
- given that labour market participation cannot be relied 
on by women to yield a livable income in later years, 
for them 'success' on the marriage market is very impor­
tant for a comfortable old age. The German research 
referred to above (Allmendinger et al) found that more 
women secure an income in old age through marriage than 
labour force participation but the most financially 
secure women succeeded in both 'markets'. Yet at rela­
tively low levels: half of the female 'double pensioners 
receiving an own pension as well as a widow's pension 
received a total amount of less than 1,000DM a month in 
1985. It is also worth noting that women who were double 






























































































1.2.4 The Privileged Role of the Patriarchal Model of Marriage 
and the Family
This is made manifest by the 'family payment' which comprises a 
payment for the main claimant plus additions for his 
'dependants', both adult and child. In Britain, the payment for 
the adult dependant averages at about 60% of that of the main 
claimant. Although formally either partner can claim family 
payments, in most cases it is the man who does so. The construc­
tion of the woman as dependant occurs in a different way for 
unmarried women. If British lone mothers on welfare enter a new 
relationship, they are likely to find that the Department of 
Social Security has cut their payment, assigning the man the 
responsibility to support her and her child, despite the fact 
that they are not married. Similarly, a British widow drawing a 
full pension is liable to have it reduced if she shares accom­
modation with a man.
1.3 Household/Family
The institutions of marriage, filiation and the resulting 
obligations of maintenance (in cash and in kind) are important 
also for the gendered distribution of income. The efficacy of 
the household or family as an income transfer system for women 
is unknown. Since poverty statistics are almost always based on 
aggregate or collective units, they can yield no information 
on poverty within households or families. What this means in 
practice is that women will only be counted as poor if they live 
in households whose collective income falls below the poverty 
line. The assumption of equal sharing of resources within 
households and families goes largely unchallenged.
It is sometimes only when families break down that female 




























































































proportion of women whose marriages have broken down and who now 
live on Supplementary Benefit believe that they are better off 
on welfare than when living with their husbands. The proportion 
varies from 18% to a third according to different studies.13
What is beyond doubt is that maintenance payments are relatively 
unimportant for women rearing children on their own. In the UK 
for instance, it has been estimated that they are the chief 
source of income for less than 7% of families after divorce.14 
In the FRG, only 15% of lone parent families headed by a woman 
rely on maintenance as their main source of income.15 Most (54%) 
of these families rely on earnings as a predominant source of 
income. In fact, in response to the reluctance of fathers to 
pay maintenance for their children, a scheme of Advanced 
Maintenance Payments was introduced in the FRG in 1979 whereby 
the state pays the maintenance for children under 6 for up to 
three years and then seeks recompense from the father.
No recent information is known for either country on the en­
forcement of maintenance orders but results from Germany in the 
1970s indicate that at least one third of all divorced and 
separated spouses as well as children holding a maintenance 
title either did not receive at all or did so irregularly.15
13. Cited in J. Pahl, 'The allocation of money and the structure 
of inequality within marriaqe', The Sociological Review, NS, 31, 
1983: 240.
14. M. Maclean, 'Lone parent families: Family law and and income 
transfers', in OECD, Lone Parent Families: The Economic 
Challenge, op cit: 95.
15. I. Fischer and R. Hauser, Lone Parent Families in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Frankfurt: J.W. Goethe Institute, 
Sonderforschungsbereich, Working paper No 275: 42 - 43.
16. E. Neubauer cited in I. Fischer and R. Hauser, Lone Parent 




























































































It has been seen above that gender and motherhood combined put 
women at financial risk. That vulnerability is realised when 
they have to raise a child(ren) alone. Hence, lone mother 
families have one of the highest rates of poverty in the two 
countries. In the UK it has been estimated that 60% of lone 
mothers are either in receipt of Supplementary Benefit (SB) 
the safety net payment - or on incomes less than 140% of SB. 
Reflecting their relatively low level of involvement in paid 
work, the high poverty levels among UK lone mothers have been 
attributed to their dependence on welfare. Research in Germany 
has found that more than one-third of lone parent families in 
1986 had incomes at or below 40% of the median adjusted family 
income.1  ̂ The comparable figure for all couples with children 
was between 8 and 9%. German lone mothers with 2 or more 
children are particularly badly off with a poverty rate of 28.8% 
in 1983 and 44.9% in 1986.
Female lone parent families have also been found to stay poorer 
longer than two parent families. Between 1978 and 1979 in the 
UK, 39% of two parent families which had been found to be poor
at the first date had crossed the poverty line while only 11% of
18families headed by a lone mother had done so.
17. R. Hauser and P. Semrau, Trends in Poverty and Low Income in
the Federal Republic of Germany. Frankfurt: J. W. Goethe
Institute, Working Paper No. 306, Sonderforschungsbereich 3, 
1989 .
18. J. Millar, 'Lone mothers' in C. Glendinning and J. Millar, 




























































































2. MODELS OF REDISTRIBUTING RESOURCES TOWARDS WOMEN
Given such inequalities, the challenge, then, is to reduce the 
unequal distribution of resources between women and men. The 
resources to be taken into consideration are money and time. 
Time is introduced along with money because the gendered divi­
sion of labour between career and care, between paid work in the 
labour market and unpaid work in households as well as the 
pooling of resources within households is widely based on the 
intra-household exchange of money and time.
The normative goal of equalization of average income resources 
between women and men as a sort of 'equality of outcome' can be 
reached in various ways:
- through an increase of women's share of total wages
- through an increase of women's share of household incomes
- through an increase of women's share of state transfer pay­
ments
- through a decrease of the share of costs of childcare to be 
borne by private households, especially by women, and increase 
of the share borne by society.
Let us consider some possible options for redistributing first 
time and then income.
2,1. Possibilities for a Redistribution of Working Time between 
Women and Men
The following are some possibilities for redistributing time:
- a general reduction of working hours in employment for all 
employees
- a right to shorter working hours under certain conditions 




























































































- a right to leave under certain conditions (parental leave, 
sabbaticals, etc.)
- a duty for men to devote a certain period of time to 'care' 
and housework, e.g. a 'social year' as an alternative to 
obligatory military service, or the obligation for every 
citizen to spend a certain number of hours in work considered 
to be socially necessary by society without pay
- obligatory quotas of women to be engaged by employers
- an increase of part-time jobs and time-patterns in employment 
which make paid work and household duties compatible
- compatible time schedules of employment and infrastructures, 
such as opening hours of shops, public institutions and of­
fices, childcare facilities, schools, holidays, etc.
- obligation on the state to provide sufficient child care 
facilities, school meals, after-school child minding, health 
care facilities
- efficient economic incentives and sanctions in legal rules to 
augment the working time of men in 'care' and housework (e.g. 
concerning parental leave); abolition of rules which make the 
entitlement to time-off for 'care' dependent on the non­
existence of another caretaker at home.
It is difficult to predict the combined effects of measures such 
as these. Although some may increase women's share of working 
hours in employment, they may not necessarily increase men's 
contribution to housework and care. Or, they may increase work­
ing hours, but not necessarily income, and could reduce the 
overall level of income (of women and men). This is particularly 
the case for deregulation measures or an increase of part-time 
and other forms of 'sub-standard' employment below a sufficient 




























































































Another problem is that regulation granting generous pos­
sibilities for time-off for household duties might have 
dysfunctional effects on the position of women in the labour 
market when leave is taken up mainly by women (despite of the 
gender-neutral formulation of the rights). This can have nega­
tive effects on the willingness of employers to engage women.
2.2. Models to. Redistribute Income towards Women
Redistribution through the labour market:
- abolition of direct and indirect pay discrimination
- augment economic benefits and entitlement to labour law and 
social security rights for 'feminized' forms of employment
- measures concerning the reforms of time-patterns of employment 
mentioned above.
Redistribution through the welfare state:
, - recognizing 'care' as work granting transfer payments and 
entitlement to rights in social security law (pension rights, 
risk insurances) based on these activities
- augmenting family allowances up to a level that covers the 
real cost of the up-bringing and care of children
- abolition of the 'head of household' assumption in various 
social security and tax law provisions and giving the entitle­
ment to transfer payments based on care activities directly to 
the primary caretaker, i.e. individualization of rights
- reform of tax law provisions which subsidize patriarchal forms 
of marriage, individualization of tax law provisions in order 
to provide economic incentives for women's employment (also 





























































































- introduction of an unconditional minimum income; as partial 
steps introduction of minimum pensions and extension of the 
existing forms of protecting minimum income levels
- socialization of the costs of childcare through the provision 
of adequate infrastructures.
Redistribution at the household level:
- introduction of an entitlement of each spouse to 50% of the 
wages of the other spouse and a corresponding share of the 
social security entitlements, pension rights and so on, sub­
stituting the right/duty of reciprocal maintenance of the 
spouses
- reform of divorce law, introducing equitable splitting ele­
ments and integrating the payment of damages to the non- 
employed or less-employed spouse who, through household 
decisions, gave up employment fully or partially to care for 
children or sick relatives (compensation of the human capital 
losses caused by work interruptions)
- the 'housewife wage1
- an unconditional minimum income
- direct entitlement of the primary caretaker to transfer pay­
ments and family allowances related to care activities.
Up to this point, we have listed a wide range of possible 
changes without taking into account their feasibility or the 
likelihood of a change of legal rules to reach the claimed goal. 
The purpose of enlisting these various approaches is to stimu­
late a discussion on strategies, on advantages and disadvantages 
of the different models for feminists. Whatever their individual 
merits, a coordinated strategy of resource redistribution is 
necessary which takes into account the different segments of the 




























































































interaction as well as the differences in women's social posi­
tion.
It is important, however, not to be too optimistic about the 
possibilities of using law as a tool of social change. It is 
very difficult to plan the outcome of legal changes and to reach 
explicit goals (which can be manifold and sometimes 
contradictory). In addition, the existence of certain legal 
rules can in practice be ignored by people because of economic 
interests, power relations and unchanging social practices. They 
can be dysfunctional also, i.e. have unintended side-effects, 
which might even counteract the formulated goal.
The remainder of the discussion concentrates on three more 
general strategies which can contribute to resource redistribu­
tion towards women:
* Individualization of rights
* The demand for a minimum income
* The distribution of costs for childcare between private 
households and society, women and men.
2.3. Strategy 1: Individualization of Rights
Individualization leads to the decoupling of an individual's 
position and rights from traditional bonds, status, kin groups. 
Rights are granted formally, independent of class, gender, 
status. The legal subject is the 'abstract individual', no 
longer the kinship, family or another group to which the in­
dividual belongs.
Individualisation, although promoted by market forces and the 
developing capitalist economy, transforming each person into an 




























































































Women were initially excluded from various political and 
economic rights. While the individualization process began 
earlier in market-related areas, it developed more slowly in 
non-market related areas. The exclusion of women from political 
rights was earlier overcome than the exclusion of women from 
economic {more costly) rights. The construction of the abstract 
individual in the market sphere relied on the ongoing existence 
of family and household structures in the non-market sphere as 
agents of subsistence production, biological and social 
reproduction and as alternative social security units. The 
idealtypical worker was constructed as 'male', free from 
household tasks which are provided by the 'housewife'. This
reduced the negative impact on the family of the mobility of
19workers by increasing that of men at the expense or women. The 
corresponding legal construction in family law was the husband's 
prerogative to take unilateral decisions on family matters in 
the German Civil Code, in force since 1900, or the fiction of 
the spouses' unity, represented in the person of the husband. 
The individualization process was thus limited by the construc­
tion of the model of the 'breadwinner/homemaker'-family which 
underlies various distribution rules and legal norms, and it was 
based on a division of labour which disadvanted women and 
limited their possibilities of individualization. Although women 
always worked and were engaged in waged work, their rights 
continued to be mediated widely through their status as 
wife/mother/daughter/widow, and they were legally constructed as 
dependants, not having rights in their own person, but only 
derived rights or none at all.
19. Reducing the potential of intra-household conflicts at the 
expense of women, a certain form of stability was established, 
see U. Beck and E. Beck-Gernsheim, Das ganz normale Chaos der 





























































































This incomplete individualization process progressed and in­
cluded more and more women, especially when their labour power 
was required in times oE labour shortages. Since the 1950s more 
married women and mothers of small children have entered the 
labour force. Today, employment of women tends to be more con­
tinuous over the life cycle, and interruptions have become 
shorter. The 1970s brought various legal reforms which speeded 
up the processes of gender-neutral formulation of legal rules 
and individualization. This affected not only labour law, but 
also family law and social security law. Nevertheless, there are 
still many economic benefits which are given to those having the 
status of head of household, main wage earner, main tax payer 
etc., usually the male. Labour market organisation requires a 
'housewife' to fulfil household tasks (especially to care for 
children) when working full-time; and working only part-time is 
usually not sufficient to earn a sufficient income.
The importance of these developments for income distribution is 
that individualization of rights progresses, but housework, 
childcare, care in general and all the 'labour of love' remains 
unpaid and not recognized as a basis of entitlement to social 
and economic rights. This marks also the limits of the strategy 
of individualization of rights which intends to make women adapt 
to the male individualization model - an individualization on
the shoulders of women, based un unpaid work in the non-market 
20sector. And when women adapt to the 'male' time patterns of
20. For a critique of the male-oriented model in law and labour 
market organization see J. Conaghan, 'The invisibility of women 
in labour law: Gender-neutrality in modelbuilding',




























































































labour market organization, the problem remains: Who will do the 
household tasks? And who will be the 'housewife' of the employed 
women?
Some feminist critiques reject the concept of individualization 
entirely saying that it is a fully male model. It is seen to 
neglect the interconnectedness and interdependency of social 
life. It is argued that the introduction of individualization, 
which is equated with market rationality, into the family would 
not improve the position of women, but hide the substantial 
inequalities. Sometimes the argument is accompanied by roman­
tic descriptions of family structures, and it is feared that 
individualization would undermine the altruistic nature of the 
family. While these arguments are mainly concerned with the 
moral and cultural (under)évaluation of care and women's work 
and provide very useful insights, they often neglect the 
economic and material dimension of it. We are here mainly con­
cerned with the latter, and its impact upon women's income 
position and 'bargaining power'.
In our view, non-individualized rights privilege men in their 
position as breadwinner/head of household economically and
(Footnote continued from previous page)
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 14, 1986: 377- 
392; R. Nielsen, Equality Legislation in a Comparative 
Perspective■ Kopenhagen : Kvindevindenskabeligbt Forlag; T.S.
Dahl, 'Taking women as a starting point, building women's law', 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 14, 1986: 239- 
242.
21. F. Olsen, 'The family and the market: A study of ideology 






























































































2 2legally and construct women as dependants. Non-individualized 
rights tie women to stereotypical images as well as to in­
dividual men, and they reinforce the gendered division of 
labour. Their discriminatory function is even more obvious when 
women do not conform to these models which presuppose a family 
household. These women are particularly exposed to the risk of 
poverty (lone parents/older women/widows/divorced), and their 
number continues to increase parallel to the growing instability 
of marriage and changing family patterns. The lasting unemploy­
ment and underemployment of a big number of men and women also 
makes non-individualized rights unjust since the pretended 
breadwinners are often incapable of earning a sufficient living 
for a household. Therefore in our view a strategy of further 
individualization of rights seems necessary to break down the 
circularity of women's oppression based on the interaction 
between labour market and family structures.
However, it must be acknowledged that various risks are involved 
in this strategy. Such risks stem mainly from the nature of the 
political reform process. Because governments and legislators 
try to save money when they have to reform institutions, they 
tend to lower the level of rights instead of extending entitle­
ment to the higher level of benefits. This happened for example 
in the case of survivor's pensions in the UK which were cut down 
to 50% when access was extended to men/widowers, or in the case 
of equalizing the pension age for men and women when the earlier 
retirement age of women is abolished and the later pension age
22. This is also the position of some Dutch feminist lawyers 
criticizing the underlying assumptions of social security law in 
the Netherlands, see R. Holtmaat, 'The power of legal concepts: 
The development of a feminist theory of law'. International 




























































































of men is universalized. Another trend is that men get access to 
some entitlements formerly reserved for women (e.g. widowers 
pensions, survivor's pensions) thereby increasing their share of 
these income resources, while the position of women remains 
unchanged or reduced.
These risks are not inherent to the concept of individualization 
as such, but linked to the question "Which rights are granted, 
and at what level of well-being?". Essentially these are politi­
cal questions. To avoid such risks it is necessary to combine 
the further individualization of rights with a strategy aimed at 
revaluing women's paid and unpaid work economically and so­
cially.23
2.4. Strategy 2: The Basic Income
This strategy aims at both a radical individualization of rights 
and a more egalitarian distribution of income. A basic income is 
understood as a state transfer payment to each individual 
(citizen or inhabitant) granted independently of income, family 
status or employment situation. It is unconditional in the sense 
that it is not dependent on a means test or on willingness to 
take up employed work. The basic income can be combined with 
other sources of income (which are taxed) and it therefore has 
no poverty traps. Essentially an equal amount is paid to all 
recipients although some differences according to age are dis­
cussed as well as higher payments for handicapped people (it is
23. In the field of political theory, Carol Pateman's work 
points in this direction to develop a positive feminist concept 
of 'citizenship', see C. Pateman, 'Women's citizenship: 
Equality, difference, subordination'. Unpublished seminar paper 




























































































controversial whether the household composition and the related 
economies of scale should be taken into account). It does not 
depend on former contributions paid or seniority in employed 
work. Opinions differ considerably concerning the level of the 
basic income: while some favour a basic income covering a decent 
existence minimum, others propose an amount below this threshold 
or leave it to procedural solutions which can be changed and 
adapted.
Without going into the details of the extended debate24, we want 
to raise some gender-related aspects of a basic income and its 
possible impact on the redistribution of income towards women. 
The gender dimension has been widely neglected in the whole 
debate.25
Arguments for a basic income as improving women's income posi­
tion include the following:
,- Since women are over-represented among the poor, they would 
profit overproportionally from a basic income and it might 
reduce female poverty considerably.
24. See for example the documentation of the debate in W. Van 
Trier (ed.), Basic Income and Problems of Implementation. 
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Basic 
Income, London. Antwerp: BIRG, BIEN, 1990; for the German debate 
see M. Opielka and G. Vobruba (eds.), Das garantierte 
Grundeinkommen. Entwicklung und Perspektiven einer Forderung. 
Frankfurt: Fischer, 1986.
25. The gender dimension is discussed only in a few 
contributions, see the articles of Blickhauser/.Molter, Erler, 
Ostner and Schreyer from 1986 in Opielka and Vobruba, op. cit. 
for the German debate; and C. Ravaioli, 'Citizenship as 
everyone's right to equal opportunity', Paper for the 3rd 
International Conference of BIEN (Basic Income European Network) 
in Florence, EUI, 19 - 22 September 1990 ; C. Saraceno, 'A 




























































































- A basic income can compensate for the unpaid housework and 
care activities which have not been taken into account ade­
quately in social security schemes up to now.
- A basic income would make women more independent of ties such 
as marriage and other economic forces which bind them to 
individual men, improving thus their bargaining power and 
freeing them from the economic constraints that force them to 
take over bad jobs in the labour market or serving men in 
households.
- The share of costs of bringing up children and caring for 
them to be borne by private households can be reduced through 
a basic income, particularly if children are also entitled to 
it.
- If a basic income covers the existence minimum, people would 
no longer be economically forced to take over badly paid, 
particularly unpleasant and stressing jobs. This may lead to 
pay increases in these sectors.
- If a basic income covers the existence minimum, men could take 
over more household tasks and childcare since the amount of 
hours in employment can be reduced without endangering the 
financial basis of the household. Based on their increased 
bargaining power, women might be in a better position to force 
men to participate in housework (or to leave them easier).
The main counter arguments include :
- The dual structure of labour markets and the concentration of 
women in the lower segments might be reinforced since the
26. We do not discuss here the questions of feasibility, the 
possible financing or the possible negative effects of a basic 
income on the incentive to take up employment. These aspects are 





























































































basic income subsidizes wage costs for employers. If this 
happened, men could defend and even increase their privileged 
position in labour markets.
- The duality of paid and unpaid work would remain basically 
unchallenged and the social character of care and other forms 
of non-market work would not be recognised adequately.
- A certain amount of socially necessary work should be done by 
everybody, therefore a basic income is not a solution (leaving 
it to the individual decision how much of such work will be 
done) but a combination of a minimum income and an obligation 
to invest a certain amount of time in necessary work is 
needed.
- A basic income would not improve women's access to other 
crucial resources (jobs, housing, childcare facilities, health 
care, etc.).
- The qualitative aspects of work and production are not taken 
into account; the alienated and unecological character of 
capitalist production would remain unquestioned.
A common element in some of these counterarguments is that 
access to the labour market (sometimes phrased as a right to 
work) is evaluated as being more important than a right to 
income. It is not evident to us why an approach to give more 
people access to the labour market and a basic income strategy 
are mutually exclusive. A basic income would make it possible to 
work less hours in waged work and still obtain a sufficient 
living, since basic income and wages could be accumulated 
(abolishing the various poverty traps included in state transfer 
systems which form a disincentive for people to take up 
employment). The improved economic viability of part-time work 
would certainly enable more people to enter the labour market 




























































































However, it appears to us that a strategy of improving women's 
access to labour markets in order to augment their earned in­
comes cannot be successful if it is not conducive to dissolving 
the existing time-patterns and work models in the labour market. 
If working hours are shortened considerably, it becomes possible 
to redistribute work so as to let the outsiders in. If the male 
model of full-time employment as it is currently organised is 
adhered to, there will not be enough jobs to give everybody 
access to the labour market; and women will continue to be 
structurally disadvantaged because of their position in the 
household economy.
If one accepts our argument that access to the labour market for 
more people and more women requires different working hours, the 
next problem to consider is whether wages earned by part-timers 
would then be sufficient to guarantee a decent level of well­
being. At the moment an individual could not live on the average 
income of a part-timer. Therefore a redistribution of wages and 
income, not only of working hours, is also needed. This could be 
one function of a basic income.
And thinking of a right to work only in terms of a right to 
full-time employment is certainly a male-biased strategy ignor­
ing the situation in the household economy. Family law 
provisions and practical needs impose not only a right to work 
in the household economy (which also men enjoy, but take up very 
reluctantly), but also a duty to work there, and to do this even 
unpaid or underpaid. Therefore work and income are already 
decoupled for women doing housework and care activities. The 





























































































How a basic income affects the dual structure of labour markets 
is an empirical question which is difficult to answer a priori. 
It is not at all evident that it would lead necessarily to a 
growth of the bad jobs in the economy, because it might enable 
people to refuse to take up these jobs (if it is high enough to 
subsist on). Also employers' reactions to economic change or 
recession have varied considerably. While in some countries or 
some segments of the economy a strategy to rely on 'cheap 
labour' was followed (as was largely the case in the U.K.), 
others pursued a strategy of rationalization and investments in 
modernization. So there is no a priori evidence that a basic 
income would lead necessarily to the reinforcement of secondary 
labour markets (the same holds true for minimum wages).
The argument that a basic income would leave untouched the 
gendered division of labour and the dichotomized character of 
paid and unpaid work does not seem to hold. Women who do the 
work of childcare now unpaid or underpaid would be economically 
better off with a basic income. Clearly the level of the basic 
income is crucial and it is also important that children too 
have a right to a basic income covering the cost of their care 
and maintenance. Their parents would then be enabled to decide 
whether they want to care for the child themselves (and the 
costs of the caretaker's time should be covered through part of 
the child's basic income), if they want to pay private 
childminders or use public childcare services (which could be 
paid collectively, i.e. deducted from the basic income of a 
child beforehand, or through fees of the users).
Other counterarguments which do not hold true belong to the 
maximalist type. It is certainly true that the basic income is 
not aimed at resolving all problems, e.g. the unecological 




























































































between different countries remain untouched. But this state of 
affairs would not be worsened by a basic income either. If 
nobody would be worse off, but some could be better off, it is a 
worthwhile goal to pursue.
2.5. Strategy 3: Redistribution of Costs of Childcare and its 
Organization
Childcare and bringing up children impose heavy burdens upon 
private households. While the resources of maintenance are 
provided for in cash mainly through wages, the bulk of the 
investment women make is in kind, through unpaid work and heavy 
investments of their time. A part of the cost is taken over by 
the state, providing benefits in cash (family allowances, 
childcare allowances, tax reductions) and in kind (childcare 
services, schooling, health care, and so on). There are dif­
ferences in degree between individual countries, but it is a 
common feature that the bulk of the cost is taken over by 
private households which means mainly through women's unpaid 
work. Changing this distribution of resources would be a major 
contribution to redistributing income towards women. Since time 
and money are interchangeable, a redistribution can be induced 
through increasing transfer payments to cover the costs of 
caring for and bringing up children, and/or through collectiviz­
ing childcare, improving childcare facilities and 
infrastructures which substitute women's working time.
Various time-budget studies have shown how time-intensive 
childcare and housework is and how women bear the major burden, 
while men's participation is negligible. The birth of the first 
child is often a changing point in the household division of 
labour and time. At this stage, households with two formerly 




























































































Research shows that the birth of the first child is often the
time when men reduce their already meagre housework time input
at the woman's expense. Although women's interruptions of
employment due to childcare duties have decreased, most of those
women returning to work reduce their working hours. Another
critical point where mainly women invest time is periods of 
• IP 77sickness of children (and also of other relatives ). This is
fostered by labour market regulations. School entry of a child
(particularly of the youngest child) is a point where time
schedules change again, although its impact on women's labour
force participation depends on various institutional factors
(like school hours, school meals, after-school childcare, public 
28transport etc. ) and on labour market demand and time patterns.
Institutional factors related to childcare which influence 
women's time budgets and household decisions are mainly:
- the organization of leave (maternity leave, parental leave, 
leaves for sick care) and the financial arrangements covering 
loss of wages during these periods
27. An investigation in 1987 in the FRG on the number and 
situation of people in need of sick care living at home 
calculated that more women (79%) than men (21%) were caring for 
needy sick people, and that women invest much more time than men 
do in this activity. Due to the high time-intensity of sick 
care, only 12% of the women nursing at home can be engaged in 
full-time gainful employment, while another 14% work only part- 
time. (Bundesministerium fur Jugend, Familie, Frauen und 
Gesundheit, Frauen in der BRD. Bonn, 1989: 58).
28. This is extensively documented in a research paper of CREW, 
Infrastructures and Women's Employment. Study on Behalf of the 
E.C. Commission, written and compiled by the Centre for Research 
on European Women. Brussels (V/174/90-EN), 1990 and in P. Moss, 
Childcare and Equality of Opportunity. Consolidated Report to 




























































































- the possibility to reduce working hours during periods of 
child care
- access to public childcare facilities and infrastructures as 
well as their time schedules and the compatibility of dif­
ferent time patterns
- the system of state transfer payments and family allowances.
To end, it is clear that the issues are complex because people's 
income resources are affected by three different systems of 
distribution each of which interact with different outcomes, 
varying across countries. Therefore, there is no universal 
panacea which could unilaterally solve the problem of women's 
financial disadvantage. It is clear to us that the gender dimen­
sion of redistribution strategies which has been largely 
overlooked has to be developed further within a comparative 
perspective.
3. SUMMARY
Despite the existence of equality legislation and many positive 
action programmes, women's income position continues to be 
significantly inferior to that of men. This paper considers the 
situation in two countries with quite different institutional 
structures - the Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom - and reviews a number of strategies for combating 
gender inequality in resource distribution.
The first part of the paper considers the empirical evidence of 
the outcomes for women of the three main income distribution 
systems: the labour market, the welfare system and 
household/family. This analysis shows that, although the in­
stitutional structures may vary between the two countries, 




























































































inferior to that of their male counterparts. Within the labour 
market, the key mechanisms perpetuating inequality are time 
organisation and wage inequities. As regards state transfers, 
their continued close connection to labour market performance, 
the lack of recognition of housework as a basis of entitlement 
and the privileged role accorded to the patriarchal model of the 
family all act to disadvantage women and, at the same time, to 
privilege men. As regards the third income transfer system - the 
household or family - it is difficult to draw firm conclusions 
on its efficacy because of absence of information. What is 
clear, however, is that women's vulnerability is realised when 
they have to rear a child(ren) alone; lone parent families 
having a very high incidence of poverty in both countries.
In the light of these facts, the second part of the paper out­
lines a number of strategies for change. It is emphasised that 
any real improvement will necessitate the redistribution of both 
time and money between women and men and that the domestic 
division of labour cannot remain as it is. Three specific 
strategies are considered in turn - individualization of rights; 
a basic income; redistribution of the costs of childcare and its 
organization. Each of these has advantages but also danger 
points which are pointed out. In the final analysis, the com­
plexity of women's income position makes a single strategy 
inappropriate. Further development and testing of these and 
other income redistribution strategies as they affect the posi­
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